The comments by Wu Zili, the acting mayor of Shanwei prefecture, which includes Wukan, suggested that authorities were taking a cautious, carrot-and-stick approach as they attempt to resolve the situation without embarrassing Beijing by prompting further violence or emboldening other protesters.
Mr. Wu said his government had almost resolved the standoff, which started in September, and blamed two village representatives for a surge in unrest since the death of a villager in police custody on Sunday.
The government says the man died of a heart attack, but residents allege he was murdered, and have erected barricades to prevent officials and police from re-entering the village in the prosperous southern province of Guangdong, which produces many of China's exports.
The Wukan revolt is this year's most serious case of mass unrest in China, which analysts say has been escalating in large part because of local officials who commandeer farmland at below market prices and then sell it to developers and pocket most of the profits.
A Wall Street Journal reporter was blocked from entering Wukan, but saw hundreds of paramilitary police, many of them with automatic weapons, guarding approaches to the village while dozens of police vehicles patrolled the surrounding area.
The protests in Wukan began months ago when the Fengtian Livestock company and Country Garden collaborated to use disputed land for development. The villagers claimed the land for their agricultural uses.
This is just one of many protests involving land grabs that have been heightened over the past few years as a result of China’s real estate boom and urbanization, which local governments rely on to boost their incomes.
So why is this one any different? There are several things about this protest that have caught our attention.
First, the duration. The villagers have maintained these protests for over several months. Usually these protests die down when local officials are able to buy off a handful of people or strike some sort of negotiation.
Second, the numbers. Although the protesters themselves only amount to a thousand or so citizens, the entire village of approximately 20,000 appears united in its stance against the local government.
And third, the response. The protests lead to the retreat of village officials and the cordoning off of the entire village from any ingoing or outgoing traffic. Although we’ve seen this tactic employed at least once before in Zhejiang province, it is not common and therefore notable.
As we’ve always stated before, many of these protests are local and can be contained locally. Ultimately they pose little threat to the central government. However, we’ve noted several incidents, including the recent protests over a factory in Dalian, where the local government has capitulated to citizen demands.
People look to Beijing to intervene against corrupt local officials, and Beijing is often able to shield itself from criticism by setting itself apart from local governments that are most often the targets of social unrest.
As China’s economy slows — and we are witnessing a rapidly slowing economy as Europe’s economic turmoil affects China’s exports — protests increase and put increasing pressure on Beijing to manage local uprisings with dwindling economic resources.
As similar protests occur throughout the country, and if they demonstrate the same level of solidarity as in Wukan, Beijing will be forced to respond and will do so through a mixture of force and incentives.
If Beijing mishandles these protests — and the margin for error increases as the protests expand and become more united — the focus could turn to the central government. Further, if protest tactics are able to increasingly force a favorable response for the citizens, they become emboldened. In the end, Beijing will not hesitate to resort to force, especially if the mandate of the Chinese Communist Party comes into question.
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